

Formal Verification based on Assume and Guarantee Approach - A Case Study

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Abstract— In this paper, we present a verification case study of the Audio Output Interface (AOF) subsystem based on a compositional verification approach known as the *Assume-Guarantee* approach. We illustrate, how designers can leverage their detailed knowledge of a design to partition it at the module level, and thereby, enable the *Assume-Guarantee* approach to overcome intrinsic limitations of a formal verification tool to successfully verify large designs.

1 Introduction

Higher device integration has spurred the growth of system on chip (SOC) designs. SOC designs being inherently large, their formal verification needs to be carried out using a divide and conquer approach to overcome the problems of state and memory explosion present in symbolic model checking. In literature, such approaches are referred to as *compositional verification*. The methods proposed in [4,5,6,7] are based on specifications described as properties in temporal logics such as CTL, or its subset ACTL, while, those in [8,9] are based on *refinement checking*, where both, the specification and the implementation are described using the same language, and the implementation description is analyzed for correctness with respect to the specification description. New languages have been proposed to support refinement checking. High level design methodologies in the industrial context are tied to *Verilog* and *VHDL*, because of the commercial CAD tool support available for them. Therefore, approaches based on refinement checking cannot be directly used in industrial designs.

In this paper, we present a verification case study based on the *Assume-Guarantee* approach, using a state of art symbolic model checking tool, BINGO [1,2,3]. BINGO supports property verification for *Verilog* and *VHDL* design descriptions. The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we briefly review the *Assume-Guarantee* approach. In section 3, we present key facts based on our analysis of the AOF architecture with respect to the specified property. In section 4, we apply *Assume-Guarantee* approach to verify AOF. In section 5, we present verification results, conclusions and suggest possible areas of investigation.

2 Assume-Guarantee Reasoning

In Fig. 1, we have a system composed of two finite state modules P and Q , which communicate with each other over wires S , and also with their external environment (dashed vertical lines).




Fig. 1 Compositional Minimization

Let, $P \parallel Q$ be the parallel composition of P and Q . Let, φ_P, φ_Q be the module specifications, or properties of P and Q , respectively. In general, a component/module of any system is optimized and implemented to function only in the environment of that system. Therefore, P will not satisfy φ_P in any arbitrary environment.

As the reachable state space of P , in isolation, can be much larger than the state space of P composed with Q , any unexpected input that it receives, will cause P to traverse an unintended path in its state space, consequently, resulting in an incorrect behaviour. This is known as the *Environment Problem* [4,6,7]. In *Assume-Guarantee Reasoning*, the *Environment Problem* is deferred by expressing any assumptions process P makes about process Q in a temporal formula ψ_Q . These *assumptions* can be used when checking that P satisfies its specification φ_P . These assumptions must, of course, be discharged relative to Q , whence they are known as *guarantees*. To do this, we use the following inference rule [7]. If $P \parallel \psi_Q \models \varphi_P$, and $Q \models \psi_Q$ then, $P \parallel Q \models \varphi_P$. By $P \parallel \psi_Q \models \varphi_P$, we imply that $P \parallel \hat{Q} \models \varphi_P$, for all $\hat{Q}$ such that $\hat{Q} \models \varphi_Q$.

By properly formulating the set of *assume* and *guarantee properties*, it is possible to demonstrate the correctness of the entire system without constructing the global state graph. The decoupling of the module interconnec-

tion necessitates recasting an original property in terms of the properties of the decoupled modules. Essentially, this amounts to a decomposition of the original property. It is here, that we need to employ a detailed analysis of the design. Decomposition renders the original verification problem into smaller verification problems involving only the individual decoupled modules.

3 Description of Audio Output Interface

AOF is a multi-media interface sub-system in a SOC, known as the *Multi Media Extension Chip (MM-ASIC)*. MM-ASIC extends the multi-media capability of an existing processor. The original description of AOF has 774 latch elements. AOF has 5 levels of module hierarchy as shown in Fig. 2. These modules can be classified under three major functional blocks related to multiple clock processing (root module - *AO_CLK*), 16 bit audio data processing (root module - *AO_CH*) and interrupt request processing (root module - *AO_IRQ*).




Fig. 2 Module Hierarchy of AOF

The designers specified an important *Data Starvation Property* for verification.

Property 1 *As long as DACK (data acknowledge signal) is received properly in response to DREQ (data request signal), UDR (data starvation signal) should never be asserted.*

3.1 Signal Flow Analysis for Data Starvation Property

AO_CH_SF asserts *UDR*. Primary signals *DACK* and *DREQ* play a crucial role in module *AO_CH_DMA*. *AO_CLK_DIV*, the third important module generates event timing signals to test for the data starvation condition. The relevant interaction between the three modules with respect to the property is shown in Fig. 3 and involves internal signals *BCLKD*, *LRCLKU*, *LRCLKD*, *GAT* and *STANDBY*.

AOF being a multiple clock design, we modified it into a single clock design, by generating internally each of its clock from a single reference clock, *GLOBAL_CLK*. For example, in the verification model *IO_CLK* is derived




Fig. 3 Module Interaction for Property 1

from *GLOBAL_CLK* by dividing it by 16. It is important to note that, only *AO_CLK_DIV* is clocked by *GLOBAL_CLK*, while *AO_CH_DMA* and *AO_CH_SF* are clocked by *IO_CLK*. The *Assume-Guarantee* approach can exploit this to significantly reduce the computational cost of verification.

4 Assume-Guarantee applied to AOF

We present, below, two key observations derived from our detailed analysis of the state transition graphs (STGs) of the three modules. *Observation 1* relates to the behaviour of *AO_CLK_DIV*, while *Observation 2* states a local property for *AO_CH_DMA*.

Observation 1 *LRCLKU and LRCLKD remain high for a single IO_CLK period and remain low for 127 IO_CLK periods.*

The STG of *AO_CH_DMA* (Fig. 5 in Appendix) has directed cycles of transition edges for processing and generating signals *DACK*, *DREQ* and *STANDBY* respectively. Each cycle has transition edges where *DREQ* or *STANDBY* are generated. The shortest and longest directed cycles (excluding self loops) involve 3 and 5 arcs, respectively. As, *AO_CH_DMA* is clocked by *IO_CLK* in the implementation model, we can state the following observation.

Observation 2 *A single traversal of any directed cycle in the STG of AO_CH_DMA, under conditions imposed by the Data Starvation Property, will require atmost 5 IO_CLK clock cycles.*

From the STG of *AO_CH_SF* (Fig. 6), we observe that in each of the directed cycles of transition edges which process *STANDBY* and generate *UDR* and *GAT*, there is atleast one transition arc controlled by either *LRCLKU*, or *LRCLKD*. Thus, a complete traversal of any of these directed cycles will require atleast 128 *IO_CLK* cycles by *Observation 1*. Therefore, with *LRCLKU* and *LRCLKD* as the event timing signals, *STANDBY* is asserted by *AO_CH_DMA* before the transition edges in the STG of *AO_CH_SF*, which process *STANDBY* and

generate *UDR*, are reached during a traversal of these directed cycles. This condition ensures that *UDR* is never asserted. Therefore, *LRCLKU* and *LRCLKD* bring about the synchronization of transitions in *AO_CH_SF* and *AO_CH_DMA* to ensure correct behaviour with respect to the data starvation property. We use these facts to specify an *assumption* on *STANDBY* for *AO_CH_SF* as given below.

4.1 Assumption on *STANDBY*

With *DACK* asserted, if *STANDBY* is asserted within 5 *IO_CLK* clock cycles of *GAT* being asserted, then *UDR* is never asserted.

The above *assumption* presumes other *assumptions* on signals *BCLKD*, *LRCLKU* and *LRCLKD*. These *assumptions* can be easily derived from the timing diagram of these signals with respect to *IO_CLK*. When the *assumptions* are treated as *guarantees* for *AO_CK_DIV* we need to recast them with respect to *GLOBAL_CLK*.

4.2 Guarantee on *GAT*

From the STG of *AO_CH_SF* we observed that, if *STANDBY* is asserted, eventually, *GAT* would be asserted. This is a *liveness property* to ensure that a new data request is issued by *AO_CH_DMA*. It serves as the *guarantee* on *GAT* for *AO_CH_SF*.

4.3 Verification of *AO_CH_SF*

The *assumptions* on signals *BCLKD*, *LRCLKU* and *LRCLKD* are reduced to a collection of simple Boolean propositions for each *IO_CLK* cycle. This collection being repetitive, can be easily specified as a path set expression in BINGO [1,2] which internally creates an equivalent FSM. For the *assumption* on *STANDBY*, we wrote an *Assumption FSM* module, whose STG is shown in Fig. 4.




Fig. 4 State Transition Graph of ASUM_FSM

Two verification scripts corresponding to each of the *guarantees* were run. The verification results are summarized in Table 1. The second column in Table 1 gives the signals with respect to which the *guarantees* in the corresponding modules are verified. The fifth and

sixth columns refer, respectively, to the number of latch bits and inputs, after using the *ReduceFSM* command in BINGO. This command removes all latches and inputs that are not related to the signals involved in the property.

4.4 Verification of *AO_CH_DMA*

We assume an appropriate behaviour for the environmental signal *DACK*, in response to the output signal *DREQ* and specify this as an input constraint in the BINGO script. For *GAT*, a liveness property was specified as a *guarantee* on *AO_CH_SF*. With respect to *AO_CH_DMA*, non-determinizing *GAT* is sufficient to verify the *guarantee* on *STANDBY* imposed by *AO_CH_SF*. Table 1 gives the verification results.

4.5 Verification of *AO_CK_DIV*

Guarantees on signals *BCLKD*, *LRCLKU* and *LRCLKD* respectively, of *AO_CK_DIV*, were written as separate path set expressions in BINGO and verified individually. As these signals are correlated a separate path set expression (PSE) was written and verified separately. Table 1 gives the verification results. The last row in Table 1 gives the results for the same property verified using only abstraction, and not decomposition (indicated by the entry in the second column).

5 Summary and Conclusions

From Table 1, it is clear that computational cost of individual module verification based on *Assume-Guarantee* approach is cheaper, as compared to the model abstraction approach. This approach needs detailed design information for its success and therefore, not easy to automate. However, for instances where it is applicable, it offers the largest possible benefits in terms of reduced computational complexity. The success of this approach has been reported only with respect to ACTL properties. For a given set of interacting components, it may not always be possible to decompose the given global property into sub-properties belonging to ACTL. A good direction to investigate would be to find the rules by which a non-verifiable design instance can be transformed into a verifiable instance by modifying the behaviour of individual modules and by changing the structure of interaction of these modules.

References

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